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THE D ·OCTFtlNE Q.F 
J IU' 1D; !11C '11AL . ~ . .! _, ... " .. ~ -- ... ~ . . ·- ·. 
E•TiO,P)P· ;E-·L, { ii1/lflt 4 ••1 • i . -~ . . . ··-. .. ~ ~ .. .. -. " 
By Steve R. Johnson, UNLV 
Tht• doctrine of judicial estoppcl 
is not on soml' law~·er.;' mdar scrcct\S. 
Th:u's rei,'T•'trablc. Not anricipnting 
i1ppli<'<l1ion of the nile, a person m:iy 
nrnkc a claim rhar can hurt him or her 
in I he lnni: run. Or, un:1w3re of rhc 
mlc, a party may foll co il'>.~rt n 
potentially ~ucn·Hfo: defense. Or, 
lmving onh• n V•~ry general uwarencss 
uf the mle, ;111 ;llrorncy may miss 
suhtlcrlr.~ nr forum v;iriatinn~ thilt <1rc 
I he <lill'crcncc lu,t ween winning :ind 
losing. 
This article has three pmts. Part I 
Jc.scrill\.-,. tl1,~ doclri1w of judicial 
csmp1>cl, c111pha,i2in11 iis purposes. 
Pnrt II ci<plon:s two n:~ccnr jmlidnl 
cstoppcl <lcdsion~of the lJni1c1I SWtt~• 
Supreme Court: C/,wl<md v. l'olii;y 
Mttllt\l?CT!tc!lll Symmu Cll'l'p.1 aml New 
I [ampJJliri! v. Maine." Finally, Part Ill 
surveys the great variation' thnL ha\'c 
<!Xisrt:d In formulations of the 
doctrine. 
THE NATURE AND ORIGIN 
OF THE DOCTRINE 
l.11w nnJ equity h;ive developc<l 
numerous doctrines of preclu~ion. 
Some are familiar and frequently 
im•okc<l, such a.s equit;iblc cstoppel,l 
collateral estoppcl, res judicata, and 
the concept of judicial ;idmlssions 
(under which a stotcmcnt by a party m 
counsel is treated as conclusively 
esrnbllshing :1 matter, obvinting the 
need for proot) .• Others .ue somewhat 
k'il.' wdl known, for t'Xample tlw 
1kictrine vf electiun, 1 various rules of 
waiver, the ,1111 y of <'.onsistc1u:y {in 
lax),7 aml - our subject. - jutlidal 
estoppcl. 
Broadly put, th,, .:kxtrinc of 
ju<llcial estoppcl prevents " perst111 
from aSli<:rtlnic dnlms, dd'c1i\cs, or 
positions thnt m·e inconsistent wit.h 
claims, dcfcru:cs, ur position~, which 
that person ns!erted In a prior 
proccedini:. The doctrine can be uscJ 
e1cher offensively or defernivcl\'. 
It Is widely n11reed thnt the 
doctrine wns first npplled in 185 7 by 
the Sunrcmc Courr of Tcnn~-sscc in M11milr~11 v. Zlmmennan.~ In thot cnsc, 
Hamilton asserted that he was 
Zimmf'mmn's parmcr In a store while 
Zimm(!rm:m claimed rhnt Hamilton 
was only a clt.tk in the titOrl'. 
i'lcatli1111s wer"' intnxluct'<I ln1m :m 
earlier cnnrt <~IMC in which Hamllron 
slntetl 1hnt allcb'ltlirni> <lt·st:rihing him 
as a clerk in I he store were ·~11l11<t>in• 
rhtlly true: ·n 1c li:nnc.'i.'i(!c Supreme 
Cuurt held rlmt such stnt<mwm> in rht! 
earlier c:uc csluppcd Hamilton from 
ui.ainlalnlng i111he scctlml l:<L\C 1.hat he 
wa~ a panncr. 
111c rnlionalcs 11dvm1ccJ for lhc 
various doctrines of preclusion advert 
sometimes lo prot~tlon of tl11: ju<llcit1I 
process anJ other times to ad1icvi11g 
foirnes.s hetween the parties. TI1c first 
of these traditlonully has prepondcr· 
nte<l in justlficntion of judicinl 
cmoppcl. The Hamilton v. Zimmennan 
court prcmisc<I the rule of preclusion 
on tlw nc•-<l to prolect the S."\llCtity of 
the oath administered to witnesses and 
-------·------ -.. -· ... ---··-----------
10 'lafoi:uanl the judicial sy•l<'lll from ;1buse nn,I ln$.S u( publk 
cstcem.• Later Jl'l:l~lons havr. srnkt'n of prescn•mlon of Judidal 
int••gritr uncl n\'oiJh1i\ ' 111i;;c,·111lim·•<'w of rejcclin~ ;m ''affront 
co judicial dil,!nity,•11 a11J uf nvoiding repetitious litigation and 
p1·otl'Ctin11 · juMiflablc relimu:c 1111 n11posing parrit:s' positions In 
licii,>:ition."11 
I lowe\'cr, the J uctrinc 11:1~ bt·t~n critiched as well, for 
imtance on gro1mJs 1lmt it can 
A. Clevelllntl v. l'olky Ma11ai:~mcn1 S~src1m C"'/" 
C:lr.,,.,,/mul invol\'ed :i frelluent judicial csloppcl h.111kgro1111d. 
Aitcr sufforing a mokl' <md loslni.; her job. Cmolyn Clevcl:~ml 
:owlil'd for anti obtained Sncinl Security Disi1liili1y l11•11r:m<'(' 
(SSDI) hrncfir~. clniming that she couldn't. work bct:a11se of lu:r 
disability. A w•~k before her ~SDI 
pt•l<lucc hari;h nnd unjust outcom•'ll 
arnl rhar it 1•iolares the 11early 
1111ivt•rs:illy accepicJ pmccicc of 
"fh1>;1dh pt11, 1lw 
awurd, Clcvcl1111d fifo<l ~uh against 
her fomtcr employer, .:0111cmli11t.i 
rh:ir hl·r flrini: was l-.e.:ause of J,.:r 
disahilu.y in \'iolutillll o( 1ltc 
Amcrkans with Disabilir ic; At:r 
(ADA). 
allowing lnctinsistcnt and 
al1crm1t ivc pleadin11s.u Thu~. 
som<" jurisdictions hnve not 
rcc.ogni?t'd the doctrine uc all <•r 
h:wl.' impo~ed clements limiting 
the dncrrinc's punch.•·• 
1 I 1 >t t r i I l l · 1 >! 111 d it 1; i I 
l'-..lt>J'jWI j'W\Ttll" :1 
l ' l'l""t>I) ll'()lll :l.'c'-i\Tlillg 
Th<' district court gmntd 
rnmmarv jud.:mem ro Cleveland'~ 
l'X«'mploycr. It rensonc..I dull 
Clt'\'t•l:tnd's claim that she wos 
rorally disabk,1 for SSDI purposes 
was inconsistent with her pro1•ing a 
m:ct:ss:try clem~nr of her ADA 
Most directly relc1•ant to 
N•'.\'a:la arrornry~. both the Ninth 
Circuit I! and the Nevacfa Supreme 
Court 1' :icn~rr thl' doctrine of 
jmlidal <"s1011pel. l lowe\'cr, It is 
foir 1.0 :;;1y rhnr n cuhcr court has yet 
"carve.I in -rone'' t.hc precise 
con1ours of rhc doctrine os they 
will apply ii, II 
J11dk1>1l r.stoppcl hns been 
riwlied ucro'l>! :i wide spectrum of 
cases an<I ccmrrovf'rsics, both 
federal and :<hllt•. It has .tp('Cllred in 
propen y, ton, concracr, .md 
commcrdttl and liui;inc:ss law c:iscs, 
nmoug 01lwrs. Alrhough much · 
num: frcqut:tll in ci\'il coscs,•e 
judicial csrop11d hns b~.tn invoked 
In crlmitu1I C:l'C' 100.:9 An are(\ in 
which the tlitt:t.rim~ is being applkd 
with incrcasini; regularity i~ 
t L1i111.-.., dt·k11"t''-i, l )r 
j'<l'-illillll'- 1'1;11 ;1rc· 
llll\111'-ii .'> ll'ill \\ill1 (·l; 1i111:--, 
1 it·lt·11...,1·"· 1 >1· I\( 1-.;i Ill ll l.'>, 
\\'l1icl11h:11 jll'l~1l11 
' d11i111: 1har ~Ill' could "pcrf1m11 the 
; c.,scnrinl fimc1 ions" t,f her job (nt 
' lt!>tst with rcnsonnble accommodu· 
1.1011).1: The fifrh Circuit affirmed, 
holding that •thl' ;ipplication for or 
1 he rcct:ipt ol soda! security 
11i:1ahili1y hl'lldlts creatl'S a rcburrnl 
presumption I hat tht' da1m:mt or 
. 1....: . ..,,·111:,l in :1 1);·1111· 
11n1cn·,li11~ 1 . 'l lh· ll11l l1i11t· , reciplenl of such b~net\ts is ~ judicially cstuppcl from ~•SSi'rring 
i that he b a 'qualifk-.1 irnlividual with 
: n disablli ty."l.I 
1 :Ill J,l. 11>1..·tl ,·j1Jh'I 
liikthi\,·\\ l>I 
l,,' I l' i l ', l \' \' h" .. 
. A 1111ani111011• Snjlr<"m•~ Court 
t reversed the dcdNion. Closely 
! reading the statutes, the Court found 
f rhor clnims for SSDI lrcncllr8 :mcl 
bnnkruptcy crrn<W\'t!rs. For 
example, dchLors whn-.c >c:h~lul~ omit pending or pOLenriul 
causes of action often find rhar thf' ornltte<l .;1;uscs of actl01\ fater 
arc dismls.~e1l hy 1 he: non·b.,nkmprcy fomm courts on Judicial 
estoppel grounds.lo 
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
01·er a humlrcJ yt'ars ago (but still lll.'llrly 40 ycurs nfLer 
Hamilton I'. 2in11t1<.'!11um), rhc Unlrctl States Supreme Courr in 
Davis v. Wttkclee mlvanccil a .• omewhat different formulation of 
ji.dicial ~toppcl 1111111 1lm1 given by chc Tennessee: Supreme 
Court. The Da..,i.1 Cour1· ~latt,d: "111ht•rc t\ party assumes a certain 
position in a lclf.il pron:cdini:. and succetds in maintninlni: that 
pn~ition, he may 1101 thereafter,: imply because his Interests hnve 
dia~eJ, assume a conunry 1Kt,ition.• u 
However, further explonu :011 nf jutlicial l'Sloppcl by the High 
Court wns deluyed for i:cncratk,,lli after /)twi.1. The drought ended 
in 1999 and 2001 when the Co11r1 h>tn,l,•il tl11w11. re'lpt.·ctl\'ely, the 
i ADA damngcs "do not it1hcrc11tly 
:· conflict to the 1101111 where wurts ;f~oul;I ttppfy ;, spt.~i~I 1i'~advc presumpti\ln like the one awlicd 
hy 1.lm Court of Appcals."14 AccordinRly, the Court 1•ac:ncd the 
Mttnmary judgment nnd rl•ttmnded the case. 
While rcjl".ctini: th~ presumption, the Court did hold 1ha1 
i11consis1.c11cy is lcg:11ly signific:int. In effcc:t, but not in n.'lmc, Lhc 
Court '~mlorscd a version of judicial l.~coppel. It held: "When 
fawJ wilh a plaintiffs ~wom statement ;werting 'tornl disability' 
or the like, th., wurt •hould require nn cxpl:m;1tion of any 
apparent inconsistcm:~· wirh rh~ neccssiry demcms o( an ADA 
claim."11 l11 uLl1cr wunls, "an i\01\ plaintiff c1mnot simph• i1more 
the apparent contr-.idkrion rh~r arises out of the earlier SSDI 
toml dls.1bilily dai111. R;uht·r. she must proffer a sufficient 
cxplnnntion. "l6 
B. New I lmnpshirc v. Maine 
Post-Clcvckutd decisions have :«~11 ( :l..'Wkmd :1~ t'stablishing 
cun1m1ud 11n /lllJ..~ 10 
The Doctrine of Judlolal Es:t_gprut.l 
" new methodology for ju<licial estuppcl in 
1he SSDl·ADA and relnted comex1s, bu1 
noc as displacin11 more traditional judicial 
em1ppel analysis in other nrc1L~.n Thm 
rl'adin:,: seems ren~onnblc in light of the 
Supreme Court's ZOOI decision in New 
Hm11/1sl1ire .,, M11ine. 
'111·11 osc involved a border dispute 
lwtwcen rwo Harts. In a 197 ,' dispute 
l'l:hv.:.·n 1 h<' tw•• ~l<ll\.'s over lobster fishinl{ 
ri1,1hts, the twn <tatl'S de~·clopd 11 consent 
dL"<ree as to their fateral marine buumLirv. 
The Supreme Court accepted that 
:ogt<'t'lllcnt ;md entered judgmtnt based on 
ir. Thl·n, in 2000, one c1fthc smr..-s (New 
H;i1111~,l1in·.) hrought an uriginnl nction 
aw~in~r rhc othl.'r as tu rheir inland river 
houmlary. Nt'.w Hampshire's position in 
1hc 2000 cnsc \\ii.; incnnsim,nr with th<' 
pnsitl1111 ii ac1:cp1cd in thl~ 1977 r.onscnt 
decree. On 1ha1 ha~i~. the otlwr ~rate 
(Main,:) m,'.<I :I lllOI iun Ill dismhs. 
A 1111m1i111rn~~ Supreme Courr grantr.d 
Mninc's 11101 inn on 1ltl: i:rnund nf judicinl 
estoppcl. In rnntra~r to rhr spe<'ial 
cswppcl rule i1 cmfic,I in Clet-t/111111, rhr 
Court in New Hmnpshirc fnmwd 1111: mlc 
ii\ tmditlomil tcnns. It idcntifiL'll I hn:c 
lncton: (I) whether the 1•ar1y's l:ill:r 
posi tion wn.~ "dcMly i1u.:unsi.•1c111• with its 
prior position, (2) wlu:thl:r the parry 
~11.;cc~'\lcd in pcrs11mli11i: a coun 111 accq.>t 
tlS L'llf!il!f jlOSillun, and (:}) Whl:tlwr the 
purty would derive 1111 unfair 111lva11111ge 
from the im:nmistcm:y i( not cstopp~.J.18 
The Court made three n1:1cr 
signlflcmll points. Fim, juclidal cswppd is 
an equitable approach which n cnurt 
lnvllkes nt its discrction.Z9 Second, in 
I 0 NB\'AOA LAWYllR • ' "'"'"'"'' J(J()] 
c1111111cml.ing 1he alx1H: ilm:c f:1.:tors, "wt' 
llo not. csluhlish inflexihle prcrcq11i~lt1•s or 
an cxhaustiw f,1r11111la (or ,le1er111i11i11g 1h.-
awlkahili1y of judicial ('.S!Opp\'I . 
Additional co11sidl:ra1iu11s mav inli>nn 1h1' 
Joctrine's applirntillll in src~il'k li11:111al 
conr.exts.''~) l11ird, Judldal 1:s1oppd is!""' 
likely tll be applied uguh1sl a 11uvcm111c111al 
party than a prin1tc litignnl', espcdnlly 
when "1:stuppcl would comprnmlse ;1 
i.:ovcmniental interest in .mfordng ti .. , 
lnw."tt 
VARIATIONS IN APPLYING 
THE DOCTRINE 
The hullmurk nf judi.::ial C$luppcl is 
lluiclity. Oiffcrenr couns disal(rcc 011 its 
clements; the same court oiten invokes 
differing fommli1tions in different cuscs. 
t\ml, in mony jurisdictions, llUiduncc a.s to 
key paramccers is scant. Commenmtor) 
nfren h:wc rcmarke,( on this v·lth cx;t,pcr· 
ation," but fluidity is pcrhap.s inc1•itable 
given the doctrine's underlying «:11ulmblc 
purpose a. 
One major division is wheth~r the 
<loci rlne cnn bl' 11pplied when the first 
d:tim was unsuccessful, 11 but m:iny other 
point~ of unrcrrnlnty or ,iis:igr ... cmcnt l'Xist 
;u; well. They indu<lc: 
(I) whether the two claims must hal'C 
hccn mad<' In rht~ snmt. f>r<'l<' ... eding (or ;it 
1t~1st in rdatcd proceedin.;s ), 
( 2) whet her I he cl;iims mnst have be ... n 
m;iJc !:dim'. the satm! 1rihunal, 
(.3) whether c!Hims hdi1n! mlminisrmrive 
11::m1cies (as well ;ts co111u) 
triufll!r thi: tlu.:uinc, 
( 4) whe1her the parties in ihe 
two proceedings must. he the 
same (01 at le11st in prh·i1y), 
(3) whether the lm.:1111si~Lcncy 
must result from an intentional 
effort I\) mislend (as opposed lO 
lnndvectencc or misrnkc). 
(6) whether the Joctrinc 
opcroces onh· as to llssercions of 
fact or extencls to legit! 
«onclushlll~ n~ well, :md 
( 7) which fnrmulnrion, umoni.: the 
•·ontlicting vcr,;ion~ held by J ifforcnt 
rn11r1~. should lie applied in diversity or 
dmke·of.l:.1w •itu:uions. 
Tht' N<'vmfo rnum h:1ve spokt'n to 
only >r>nw of thcsl' 1narrt•rs.J• Moreovi:r, it 
wrntltl Ill.' wrong to think th•U unanimity, 
01· ,:,·en strong co11.«.·n~m, prev:i ils in 
Ncv.i,fa ns h> im[1<1ttant p:.1rarncters. A 
rcctnt Nt:v:ida S11prcm1~ Coun: l'.;1$t shows 
al1i~.JI Ay 4 tn '\ , rhr Court hdcl that :\ 
former ~JM»1st: was judicially 1ml)pped from 
atla1:kin1: a divutl'.c <ll,cn·l' (on rhe ground 
that the triul mun had lacked jurliidic· 
1i,m) i11 liul11 of1he fo(I slu: h;u l pr.,vi•"1sly 
agrccJ 1.hn1 ccr111i11 "facts" Wt!rt~ rn1c, 
which (had 1hcy lll·c11 l ruc) would have 
l!(iven that co:.trt jurlsc.liction.~ One Ju~tkc 
Ji.sagrced, appearing 10 say ilm1 judlci:tl 
estoppcl can involve only s11h.i1111l i\'I' 
i5Sucs within an othcrwi$\: •1111pcr case, nnl 
iurlsdiclional usucs.l1 'livo n1hcr J 11~tll:1~' 
disscnw<l based on their pcrccpti.111 of I he 
(.•qultics, t!mphnshlni: "lm1dvcne11cc or 
mistake" as opposed to knowing misrcprc· 
sencation. '-< 
l.n shore, judicial esmppel is 
rccognhed in Nevn<la nnd p..ltenth1lly 
applies across many cnteSloric.• of cases. 
I luwever, there rcnwins coruiJcrnble 
scopl.' for crenri\•e ndvocacr in shaping the 
contours of the doctrine and its 
npplicntlon IC- particulnr controvt>rsics. N. 
The 111ir/1or Is !ht E .L.. \Viegand Prof mor Ill 
iht: \'t'iUiam S. l:luy(l School of Lmv, 
l!niwr.~icy of Ne•.Nult1, l.11s VeJrllS. A 1981 
g1wlu1ur of New Yc1rk l/mwrsiJ.J School of' 
I .llw, he "'"'~ in />rivaie procci(e a.t 11 .".w.nior 
Aummy tllidr rk 11{.'I C.:liirf Cmtn.~el's 
Office, and <ts a S/1ec:iul As.~isuutt IJ11i1ed 
St.ue~ 1\1111n~y. The authm i1wilt'.~ 
comments and q1u:s1io11s 111 
scc1~.joh1uon@ccnull.net~.eJu 
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